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Explosive devices are the most common weapons used by terrorists. The damage inflicted in 
recent events in India, Pakistan, Spain, Israel, and the United Kingdom demonstrates the impact
o f detonating explosives in densely populated civilian areas. 
Explosions can produce instantaneous havoc, resulting in 
numerous patients with complex, technically challenging 
injuries not commonly seen after natural disasters. Because 
many patients self-evacuate after a terrorist attack, prehospital 
care may be difficult to coordinate and hospitals near the scene 
can expect to receive a large influx, or surge, of patients after a 
terrorist strike.
The threat o f terrorism exists at a time when hospitals in the 
United States are already struggling to care for patients who 
present during routine operations each day. Hospitals and 
emergency health care systems are stressed and face enormous 
challenges. W ith the occurrence of a mass casualty event (MCE), health systems would be expected 
to confront these issues in organization and leadership, personnel, infrastructure and capacity, 
communication, triage and transportation, logistics, and legal and ethical challenges.
The purpose o f this interim guidance is to provide information and insight to assist public policy and 
health system leaders in preparing for and responding to an M CE caused by terrorist use of explosives 
(TUE). This document provides practical information to promote comprehensive mass casualty care 
in the event of a TU E event and focuses on two areas:
1. leadership in preparing for and responding to a TU E event, and
2. effective care o f patients in the prehospital and hospital environments during a TU E event.
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This guidance recognizes the critical role that strategic leadership can have on the success 
or failure of preparing for and responding to a terrorist bombing. It outlines important 
leadership strategies for successfully preparing for and managing a TU E mass casualty event, 
including the concept o f meta-leadership. Effective meta-leaders employ influence over 
authority and activate change above and beyond established lines of their decision-making 
and control. They are driven by a purpose broader than that prescribed by their formal 
roles. Therefore, they are motivated and act in ways that transcend usual organizational 
confines, enabling them to successfully confront challenges and barriers in communication, 
organization and response, standards of care, and surge capacity.
The successful medical response to an M CE depends on effectively coordinating three 
critical areas of patient care: 1) prehospital care, 2) casualty distribution, and 3) hospital care. 
Critical steps must be taken throughout the response to ensure rapid and efficient patient 
triage, effective and appropriate distribution o f patients to available hospitals and health 



































C H A P T E R  O N E
Introduction
Purpose
The purpose o f this interim planning guidance is to provide valuable information and insight to 
help public policy and health system leaders at all levels prepare for and respond to a mass casualty 
event (MCE) caused by terrorist use of explosives (TUE). Medical preparations for an M CE have 
traditionally focused on the scene and prehospital sectors. Comprehensive mass casualty care, 
from a health systems perspective, has received far less attention and has evolved separately from 
the rest of the emergency response community. This document provides practical information to 
promote comprehensive mass casualty care in the event o f a TUE. It is not intended to reflect U.S. 
Department of Health and Hum an Services (DHHS) policy but, rather, to provide public policy 
and health systems leaders with options to consider when planning their response to an MCE. This 
document is a collaboration between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the 
National Preparedness Leadership Initiative of Harvard University. C D C  provides additional specific 
mass casualty and blast-injury related material that complements this document. These materials 
include “Blast Injuries: Fact Sheets for Professionals,1” “In a M om ent’s Notice: Surge Capacity for 
Terrorist Bombings: Challenges and Proposed Solutions,2” and the “Bombings: Injury Patterns and 
Care”3 course.
Primary Objectives
The ultimate aims of this guidance document are to:
1. improve decision making during TU E-M CE events, strengthen system and clinical responses, and 
reduce morbidity and mortality;
2. identify leadership strategies that improve preparedness for and response to TU E-M CE events;
3. promote connectivity, coordination, integration, and consistency between the medical response 
community and emergency management;
4. encourage health system resilience and maximize the ability to provide adequate medical services 
during an MCE;
5. enhance the quality o f existing M CE preparedness and response programs used by medical 
response entities; and
6. provide a resource tool that could be applied during exercises and lower intensity emergency events.
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Background and Structure
Terrorists worldwide have repeatedly shown their willingness and ability to use explosives to inflict 
significant death, destruction, and fear. A sudden and unpredictable bombing-related M CE requires 
an immediate response; disrupts communication systems; interrupts transportation o f casualties, 
medical personnel, and supplies; and may overwhelm the capacity o f responding agencies.
Even though explosives are the primary weapons used by terrorists, the U.S. health care system 
has minimal experience in treating patients with explosion-related injuries. Detonating devices in 
crowded public places results in complex, technically challenging injuries not commonly seen after 
natural disasters. Deficiencies in response capability could result in increased morbidity and mortality 
as well as stress and fear in the community.
Because o f the injuries sustained by large numbers of people, 
explosions produce unique management challenges for health 
providers, beginning with an immediate surge of patients into 
surrounding health care facilities. The potential for large numbers of 
patients arriving within a few hours may stress and limit the ability of 
emergency medical services (EMS) systems, hospitals, and other health 
care facilities to care for critically injured victims.4-6
The ongoing and increasing threat o f terrorist activities, combined 
with documented evidence of decreasing emergency care capacity 
within the U.S. health care system,7-14 requires proactively preparing 
for these situations. Health care and public health systems, individual 
hospitals, and health care personnel must collaborate to ensure that 
strategies are in place to address these key challenges:
• receive, evaluate, and treat large numbers of injured patients,
• rapidly identify and stabilize the most critically injured,
• evaluate response efforts, and



































This document focuses on the main issues and challenges in medical preparedness and response across 
the three care settings related to an MCE:
1. field care and patient triage,
2. transportation and distribution, and
3. hospital-based acute care.
The guidance is organized by using terminology and concepts of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security’s National Planning Scenario #1 (explosives attack) and National Response Framework 
and D H H S ’ “Medical Surge Capacity and Capability Handbook.” This document is based on 
international experience for preparedness and response to mass casualty terrorism events.
Nature of Explosions
An explosion is caused by the sudden chemical conversion of a solid or liquid into a gas with resultant 
energy release. Explosive devices are categorized as either high-order explosives (HE, such as C4 
and T N T ) or low-order explosives (LE, such as pipe bombs, gunpowder, and Molotov cocktails).
HE detonation involves supersonic, instantaneous transformation of the solid or liquid into a gas 
occupying the same physical space under extremely high pressure. These high-pressure gases rapidly 
expand outward in all directions from their point o f formation as an overpressure blast wave. The 
extent and pattern of injuries produced by an explosion are determined by several factors:
• amount and composition of the explosive material,
• delivery method,
• distance between the victim and the blast,
• setting (open vs. closed space, structural collapse, intervening barriers), and
• other accompanying environmental hazards.
Nature of Injuries
Blast injuries are categorized as primary, secondary, tertiary, or quaternary. Primary blast injuries result 
from HE detonations and the impact of the blast wave on the victim’s body. Damage occurs primarily 
in gas-containing organ systems (e.g., lungs, ears, gastrointestinal tract) at the air-fluid interface.
Also, increasing evidence shows primary blast injury to the brain. Secondary blast injuries result from 
penetrating and blunt trauma caused by fragments and flying objects striking the victim. Tertiary 
blast injuries include blunt and penetrating trauma caused by displacement of the victim (e.g., being 
thrown against a wall). Quaternary (formerly miscellaneous) blast injuries are other injuries resulting 
from detonation of an explosive device and exacerbation o f chronic diseases resulting from the blast. 
These injuries include burns caused by the thermal effect of the explosion or consequent fires, crush 
injuries caused by structural collapse, and toxic inhalations from a component of the explosive device 
or the resultant spillage of hazardous materials.
The location of an HE detonation affects the types of injuries encountered. Explosions in confined 
spaces (e.g., bus, subway, building) cause the blast wave to be reflected by the containing surfaces, 
resulting in increasing wave pressures affecting casualties. This phenomenon places victims of
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enclosed-space detonations at increased risk for primary blast injuries. For more information on 
diagnosing, treating, and managing blast injuries, visit http://emergency.cdc.gov/masscasualtiesl 
blastinjuryfacts.asp.
Terrorism Explosions and Health Care Facilities
The chaos generated at the scene o f a TUE-M CE is subsequently shifted throughout all phases of 
the system response. This chaos often leads to disruption o f communication systems and interruption 
of transporting patients, medical personnel, and supplies and can overwhelm the capacities of 
responding agencies. W ith prior planning and practice, receiving facilities can minimize the 
disarray and confusion associated with receiving large numbers o f patients in a short period of time. 
Planning for the bombing aftermath requires new thinking in several areas, including leadership, 
prehospital and hospital surge capacities and capabilities, distribution of patients, crowd control, 
and media relations.
During an MCE, health care systems will be confronted with increased demands and decreased 
availability of resources. Regional health care systems best understand their own needs and resources 
and must, therefore, develop specific disaster medical surge capacity and capability plans.
The medical response to an M CE consists o f two distinct but interrelated spheres of emergency 
medical management and care: 1) the explosion scene and 2) the receiving hospitals. These spheres 
should be linked by a process of EMS effectively distributing patients.
Expected Health Systems Challenges
Emergency departments (EDs) routinely operate above capacity, with prehospital personnel 
occasionally forced to wait for extended periods before transferring patient care to hospital staff. 
Patients are frequently evaluated and treated in ED hallways, where they may remain for hours 
or days awaiting a hospital bed. The 113.9 million visits to EDs in the United States in 2003 
represented a 26% increase from 1993. During this 
same period, the number of EDs decreased by 14%8 
and hospitals eliminated more than 10,000 staffed 
inpatient medical surgical beds and 7,800 intensive 
care unit beds.9 In addition, although about 75% of 
U.S. hospitals’ disaster plans address explosives, only 
about 20% of hospitals have conducted at least one 
drill or exercise involving use of explosives.15 The 
overburdened health system will be further strained by 
a rapid patient surge associated with a TUE-M CE.
Leadership
Effective preparedness and response demand an established, functional leadership structure with 
clear organizational responsibilities. In many instances, particularly at a local operational level, such 
preparation has not occurred. Confusion over roles and responsibilities may occur and increases the 
potential for redundant efforts or gaps in decision-making and response.
Key Health System Challenges
1. Leadership
2. Prehospital care
3. Patient transport and distribution
4. Hospital care



































Responding to terrorist bombings requires meta-leadership. 
Meta-leaders are vital in preparing for and responding to bombings, 
and their roles extend far beyond hospitals and emergency services. 
Detailed information about meta-leadership and planning needs in 
this area is provided in Chapter 2.
Prehospital care
Prehospital care of bombing victims may strain emergency 
personnel. Key factors to include in planning, which are covered 
in Chapter 3, are minimizing dispatch times for first responder 
arrival at the scene; rapidly assessing the situation and appropriate 
care needed; protecting on-scene personnel, including awareness of 
devices; preventing further injuries through prom pt removal of victims; 
ge, initiating lifesaving interventions, and appropriately transporting
Patient transport and distribution
M any planning scenarios adequately address prehospital and hospital clinical care, but few consider 
the potential problems o f casualty distribution. As in any emergency, distribution involves matching 
the medical needs of victims to available transportation and medical facilities. Because of the unusual 
nature o f injuries found in bombing casualties and the large numbers of simultaneously injured 
persons, a coordinated plan for distributing casualties must be a key component of preparedness 
plans. Factors to consider when developing plans for patient distribution are discussed in Chapter 4.
Hospital care
In responding to a terrorist bombing, hospitals must prepare to address large numbers of patients 
in a short period of time. Such preparedness will affect not only emergency and trauma services but 
also other medical, paramedical, administrative, logistical, and security functions. Decisions and 
policies developed in advance o f a bombing should reflect state and local regulations and guidance.
A full exploration of the many aspects of hospital care relevant in a bombing aftermath is contained 
in Chapter 5.
Community and media relations
The community targeted by a bombing suffers the most extensive physical and psychological 
effects and should be part of preparedness planning. Involving community organizations, religious 
institutions, and local businesses in planning and response efforts can help to calm fears and prepare 
people should a bombing occur. Another critical partner in this education effort is the local media. 
Guidance for communication and information sharing is included throughout this document.
potential secondary explosi 
and implementing patient 
and distributing patients.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
Principles for Health Systems' 
Preparedness in Emergencies
To prepare for a terrorist use of explosives-mass casualty event (MCE), health systems leaders must 
focus on 12 principles.
Provide Meta-Leadership
Managing a bombing crisis requires more than good leadership; it requires meta-leadership. The 
prefix meta has many meanings, including a more comprehensive form o f a process (e.g., meta­
analysis) and the designation o f a new but related discipline. Both of these meanings are relevant, 
as meta-leadership is a new kind of leadership for new kinds o f challenges.
Meta-leadership is defined as overarching leadership that connects purposes and works of different 
organizations or organizational units.16 In many organizations, individuals take on roles and 
responsibilities outside o f their official position descriptions and use various abilities to augment 
the overall operation o f the organization. This ability to assume additional responsibilities is typical 
of people who are capable of being meta-leaders. In addition, with training and practice, managers 
or other team members can become meta-leaders and assume formal roles for making necessary 
connections within their own organizations and across organizations.
Principles of Preparedness
1. Provide meta-leadership 7. W ork effectively with the media
2. Decide who is in charge 8. Develop connected emergency plans
3. Be proactive and expect the 9. Communicate during an MCE
unexpected 10. Be prepared for legal and ethical
4. Learn from others issues
5. Exercise MCE response plans 11. Alter standards of care



































Meta-leaders possess unique mindsets and skills, often going beyond the scope of their experiences. 
They are also able to build strong alliances with a diverse array of leaders before an event occurs.
The five dimensions of a meta-leader, which must be used with flexibility and adaptability, are
• The Person of the Meta-Leader: Meta-leaders lead themselves and others out of the 
“basement” to higher levels o f thinking and functioning.
• Situational Awareness: A problem, change, or crisis compels the meta-leader to respond.
• Leading the Silo: The meta-leader triggers and models confidence, inspiring others to 
excellence.
• Leading Up: The meta-leader leads up the chain of command and guides political, business, 
and community leaders.
• Leading Cross-System Connectivity: Meta-leaders strategically and intentionally devise 
cross-silo linkages that leverage expertise, resources, and information.
M e ta -leaders bu ild  a n d  m a in ta in  Effective meta-leaders initiate change outside of their
previously established lines of decision-making and control.
re la tionships an d  establish c lear
They are driven by a purpose broader than that prescribed by 
channels o f  com m un ica tion . their formal roles and are motivated and capable of actions
that transcend usual organizational confines. In this way, 
meta-leaders successfully confront challenges and barriers in communication, organizational response, 
standards o f care, and surge capacity.
Meta-leaders build and maintain relationships and establish clear channels of communication.
They encourage connectivity, which is built during preparedness and examined during crisis.
This connectivity is important because each emergency response discipline brings unique and 
valuable expertise that contributes importantly to M CE readiness in the community. However, the 
multitudes of medical and nonmedical responders who have a critical piece of responsibility in saving 
lives typically have different plans, emergency terminology, standards, operational methods, and 
classifications. Many do not have a good understanding o f one another’s roles and responsibilities in 
an MCE. Vertical and horizontal integration of existing medical resources in a timely and efficient 
manner is a major tool for saving lives during an MCE.
Decide W ho is in Charge
Clarifying the response process for leadership, the chain o f command, responsibilities, and 
coordination is critical— especially during a crisis. The M CE response should be led and coordinated 
by two main levels of operation centers: 1) the unified crisis command center for the local area, 
which brings together all relevant responding agencies; and 2) the medical command and control 
center, which coordinates all medical aspects of the MCE. These operation centers can exchange 
information, develop a common picture of the event and available resources, direct capabilities and 
resources, coordinate the flow of casualties, maintain mutual communication and understanding, 
and lead the public messages.
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Be Proactive and Expect the Unexpected
Preparedness must be undertaken ahead of time. Crisis situations are bad times for planning. No 
matter how carefully developed a response plan, unexpected events are likely to occur. Recognizing 
the likelihood of unexpected events will allow for appropriate preparation during the response effort. 
Crisis leaders should expect that planning will be imperfect and learn to expect the unexpected.
Learn From Others
Many useful lessons can be learned and adapted from real health system responses to civilian terrorist 
bombings in the United States and abroad (e.g., Israel, the United Kingdom, Spain, India, Pakistan, 
Turkey). The body of literature in disaster medical preparedness is growing, much o f it related to the 
response to terrorist bombings. A review o f this literature, interviews with individuals involved, and 
site visits to locations o f previous bombing incidents provide many useful lessons that can be adapted 
for bombing terrorism preparedness and response in the United States. This effort can provide 
information on both clinical care and systems issues and highlight effective strategies, bottlenecks, 
challenges, and lessons learned.
Exercise Mass Casualty Event Response Plans
Simply drafting preparedness plans can give a false impression of being prepared. Instead of relying on 
paper preparedness, mounting an effective response following a bombing requires regularly exercising 
the plan and building organizational and individual resilience. Drills and tabletop exercises are major 
tools for improving interfaces and connectivity by allowing potential event response personnel to put 
disaster preparedness into practice.
All health system providers must understand, practice, and implement specialty-appropriate 
preparedness. Exercises should include the types o f patients expected, simulating both actual 
patients and the worried well, and involve all emergency response stakeholders from public, 
private, community, and governmental agencies.
Involve the Public
Com munity residents are often the first preventers 
of and responders to an MCE. They should be 
integrated into bombing terrorism preparedness 
and response. Planning a medical response to an 
M CE must be comprehensive and community 
based, and clear communication with the public 
is essential before, during, and after an MCE.



































W ork Effectively W ith the Media
A strategy for clear, reliable, and contiguous messages should be established to inform the public 
continuously about the progress o f the event. Effective pre-event planning and coordination, 
including all authoritative agencies articulating a clear and consistent message, is critical. Leaders have 
a great deal of influence over the expectations, understanding, and responses of both individuals and 
communities to an MCE. The management of the acute situation sets the tone for the community’s 
response. The accurate description of ongoing efforts and successful forecasting o f predictable events 
will enhance the credibility o f authorities and diminish negative outcomes. Informing the public
in a timely manner can decrease the
In fo rm ing  the pub lic  in a t im e ly  m anner can 
decrease the f lo w  o f  w orr ied  well pa tien ts  and  
lessen dem ands on the health care system.
flow o f worried well patients and lessen 
demands on the health care system. This 
communication planning should be a joint 
effort of key stakeholders.
Develop Connected Emergency Plans
Preparedness and response plans should build upon each other and be based on existing federal and 
state plans using standard protocols, processes, tools, and terminology.
Communicate During a Mass Casualty Event
Maintaining continuous communications among all emergency participants is crucial during a 
response. Emergency responders must be able to communicate effectively with one another in real 
time, using a common terminology and resilient communication networks. Timely and accurate data 
gathering and analysis must be coupled with effective and rapid dissemination of such information 
to responders.
Internal Communications:
Hospitals should have sufficient 
communication modalities so that 
failure of one mode does not cripple 
all communications. Important 
telephone numbers and staff contact 
information must be readily available 
and regularly updated.
External Communications:
Effective external communication 
during a bombing response is 
essential. Telephone (cellular and 
landlines) should be the main 
mode o f communication; radio 
communication, e-mail, and text 
messaging may be effective backups. 
Phone numbers should be checked 
and updated regularly.
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Be Prepared for Legal and Ethical Issues
Preparedness should include consideration o f all potential legal and ethical problems that could be 
related to mass casualty response. Ethical considerations should be explicit during preparedness so 
that critical decisions made during crises
can be based on the spirit o f the ethical The ra tiona le  fo r  m od ify ing  s tandards o f
judgments that guided the p lanning p rocess. care in an em ergency is th a t more patients
w il l  survive a terroris t attack.
A lter Standards of Care
The system should be refocused during crisis response to accomplish the greatest good for the 
community (i.e., save the most victims). The rationale for modifying standards of care in an 
emergency is that more patients will survive a terrorist attack if key lifesaving interventions are 
provided to the greatest number o f casualties likely to benefit from care. Hospitals and emergency 
medical services systems above surge capacity will require autonomy to alter regular standards of 
care and shift to emergency critical care practices. However, no universally accepted methodology 
for this adjustment exists, and the process is associated with potential ethical, societal, medical, and 
legal issues.
A protocol is needed to determine when and how to deviate from the norm without repercussions 
for the health care provider or facility. An altered protocol would improve the management of 
assessment, treatment, flow, and outcomes for the greatest number of patients. Changing standards 
of care will require a formal process in each community to determine when and how to transition 
from standard operating procedures to an altered standard of care. In August 2004, the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality at the U.S. Department o f Health and Hum an Services convened 
a panel of experts to examine the complex issues surrounding alterations in clinical care. The panel’s 
findings are published in the monograph Altered Standards o f Care in Mass Casualty Events.17
Develop Resilient Medical Surge
Medical surge is the ability o f the health care system to expand capacities and capabilities beyond 
normal services quickly to meet an increased demand for medical care. Medical surge has two 
components:
1. Medical Surge Capacity: the ability to respond to a markedly increased number or volume of 
patients; and
2. Medical Surge Capability: the ability to manage patients requiring unusual or very specialized 
medical evaluation and care (e.g., pediatric care, neurosurgery, chest surgery, angiography, and 



































C H A P T E R  T H R E E
Prehospital Care
Introduction
During a mass casualty event (MCE), the emergency medical services (EMS) systems are responsible 
for first responder rescue, casualty collection, triage, initial treatment, and transportation to the 
appropriate medical facilities. In the United States, EMS is provided through a complex system of 
multiple and variable organizational structures. No single oversight agency is responsible for ensuring 
consistency and integration in preparing for and responding to a crisis.
Basic Principles for Prehospital Care During a Terrorist Use of 
Explosives-M ass Casualty Event
•  Maxim ize availab ility of emergency medical services personnel and resources
•  Assess the situation and care required
•  Protect on-scene personnel
•  Stage and triage patients
•  Provide appropriate transportation and distribution of patients
•  Manage fatalities
Basic Principles for Prehospital Care During a Terrorist Use of 
Explosives-mass Casualty Event
Planning for prehospital surge capacities and capabilities should include the following components.
Maximize availability o f  emergency medical services personnel and resources
• Modify and extend shifts, bring personnel from home, and recruit medical and nonmedical 
volunteers as appropriate.
• Prepare for excessive strain on EMS answering points and dispatch.
• Concentrate on preserving the communication system among EMS, other emergency 
responders, and hospitals and design contingencies for alternative communication.
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Institute call-screening strategies to determine the level of urgency required to address 
calls, including preset recommendations for various call scenarios from the anxious public, 
survivors, families of missing persons, and potential volunteers.
Maximize the efficiency of available vehicles, coordinate all ambulance services, bring 
ambulances to full capacity, deploy alternative vehicles, and consider air transportation for 
primary distribution (from the field to the hospital) and for secondary distribution (relocation 
from one hospital to another).
Assess the situation and care required
• Observe the nature and characteristics o f the explosion to anticipate likely complex 
presentations, including penetrating, blunt, and thermal injuries. Consider where the 
explosion occurred, whether it was in an open space or confined area, how many explosions 
occurred, and where victims were in relation to the blast. These and other bomb-related 
factors could influence the patterns of injuries and the
methods of response.
• Manage terrorist use o f explosives (TUE) EMS 
information to maintain maximum capability while 
minimizing confusion. Report the situation status 
early in the response and include such information 
as a description o f the incident, on-scene hazards 
and challenges, casualty estimates, access routes and 
availability, resource status, and anticipated needs.
• Institute an EMS on-scene staging process for effective 
use of arriving resources by scene managers. As 
assets arrive on the scene, register and deploy them 
immediately to the on-scene manager. Ensure that 






































• Recognize that first responders may represent a number o f disciplines in addition to EMS, 
including bomb squads, firefighters, search and rescue, hazardous materials responders, media, 
volunteers, and law enforcement providing scene security, investigation, and traffic control.
• Before searching for casualties, receive permission from the incident commander to ensure 
that the area is safe for first responders to enter and that the threat of secondary device 
detonation has been evaluated.
• Protect EMS personnel and other first responders from exposure to environmental and 
infectious pathogens.
Stage and triage patients
• Remove victims from direct hazard impact areas and stage them into the EMS system for 
triage and distribution to definitive care.
• Establish patient holding areas to prepare for formal triage and treatment protocols. 
Depending on the situation, patients may move through the defined holding areas or go 
directly into rapid triage and distribution to hospitals.
• Shift health care priorities to those critically injured patients who are most likely to survive.
• Focus treatment of casualties in the field on basic medical care primarily directed toward 
stabilizing life-threatening medical conditions.
Provide appropriate transportation and distribution o f  patients
• Provide adequate transportation and be prepared to balance distribution to appropriate 
medical facilities.
• Do not assume that casualties will be distributed to appropriate facilities. Chapter 4 discusses 
factors to consider in planning for most effectively distributing casualties after a TUE.
Manage fatalities
• Prior to a bombing event, address such issues as cataloging of bodies; availability o f body bags 
and refrigerator trucks; and return of bodies, hum an remains, and personal belongings to 
authorized persons.
• Following a TUE-M CE, avoid transporting bodies and remains from the scene to hospital 
treatment areas.
• Pay attention to and be respectful of varying religious beliefs when handling bodies and remains.
• Consider designating alternate sites outside of hospitals for managing and storing human remains.
• If possible, document the identity of the dead, hum an remains, and associated personal 
belongings. As soon as possible after the crisis, begin to identify human remains using 
scientific means (e.g., dental records, pathology, anthropology, fingerprints, D N A  samples).
Dealing with fatalities can have profound and long-lasting consequences for survivors. It is one o f the 
most difficult features o f crisis management. Coordination and planning with local community and 
law enforcement agencies, which typically handle identification and disposal of hum an remains, are 
important aspects of managing an MCE.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
Patient Distribution
Introduction
The successful medical response to a mass 
casualty event (MCE) depends on effectively 
coordinating three areas: 1) prehospital care,
2) patient distribution, and 3) hospital care.
Although the prehospital and hospital areas are 
reasonably well established, patient distribution 
is often neglected— particularly in countries 
with limited experience with terrorist bombings.
Patient distribution relies on appropriately 
matching patient needs with transportation assets and availability and capabilities of medical 
facilities. Appropriate patient distribution is necessary to prevent movement of chaos from the field 
to hospitals.
Levels of Patient Distribution
The two levels of patient distribution are primary and secondary.
Primary distribution refers to moving patients from the scene to the hospital. The three methods 
currently in use for primary distribution, ranked from most to least desirable, are
• Controlled Primary Distribution: This method, controlled by the medical command and 
control center (M CCC), is the best method for primary distribution of casualties. The M CCC 
should use an information system that provides ongoing updates of hospital capacities and 
capabilities and helps emergency medical services (EMS) determine the optimal destination 
for each casualty.
• Semi-Controlled Primary Distribution: In the absence of a functioning M CCC, this 
method can promote equitable distribution of casualties. Rather than trying to match the 
specialized needs of each victim to the appropriate hospital, the event commander distributes 
equal numbers of casualties to each regional hospital on a rotating basis.
• Spontaneous Primary Distribution: Although the least desirable, this distribution method 
is the most common. Ambulances and other vehicles transport victims to the closest hospital, 
with no connectivity, control, or coordination.
Levels of Patient Distribution
•  Primary distribution
o Controlled primary distribution 
o Semi-controlled primary distribution 




































Secondary distribution refers to moving patients from the first receiving hospital to a second 
medical facility to receive either a higher or more specialized level of care or less specialized care. By 
practicing this secondary distribution, casualties can be redistributed from overloaded hospitals and 
care sites to less affected ones. All hospitals must develop formal and practical relationships with 
designated trauma and specialty centers to ensure that, when necessary, casualties will have access to 
appropriate levels o f care.
Effective and Controlled Distribution
Controlled distribution of casualties during the response to a terrorist bombing is critical for 
matching needs to resources and minimizing hospital overload.
• In matching patients to hospitals, take patient needs and 
hospital capabilities into account. The vast majority of 
survivors of a bombing event will have minor injuries and 
will likely be discharged after evaluation and treatment in 
an emergency department.
• Centralize coordination o f patient transport and 
distribution to minimize hospital overloading and 
maximize use o f all available medical facilities including 
hospitals and clinics.
A ll hospita ls must develop fo rm a l an d  p rac tica l re la tionships w ith  
des igna ted  traum a a n d  specia lty  centers to ensure that, when  
necessary, casualties w ill have access to ap p ro p r ia te  levels o f  care.
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C H A P T E R  F i V E
Surge Capacities and 
Capabilities for Hospitals
Introduction
The major challenges that hospitals will face in a mass casualty event (MCE) include surge 
capacity and capability issues in emergency and trauma services, as well as medical, paramedical, 
administrative, logistical, and security challenges. Difficult decisions will have to be made regarding 
the allocation of available resources. These decisions should reflect state and local regulations and be 
developed before an MCE.
Common Challenges for Hospitals in Terrorist 
Bombing Aftermath
Terrorist use of explosives (TUE) often creates four distinct types of mass events: 1) mass casualty 
events, 2) mass fatality events, 3) mass anxiety events, and 4) mass onlooker events (e.g., families, 
media, curiosity seekers, volunteers, politicians, public officials). Hospital emergency leaders should 
consider these events and be prepared for their simultaneous occurrence.
Predicting patien t inflow
W ithin a few hours of a bombing event, most 
acutely injured patients are likely to have arrived 
at the closest medical facilities. A number of 
patients may be affected by factors such as 
transportation difficulties and delays, security 
issues at the event site, multiple explosions, 
and secondary effects of the bombing (e.g., 
building collapse). Stress and anxiety caused 
by time urgency and large numbers of victims 
contribute to overtriage and failure to alter 
the balance between quantity of patients and 
standard of care.
Common Challenges for Hospitals
•  Predicting patient inflow
• Delays in declaring a mass casualty event
•  Time constraints
•  Limited health care workforce



































Hospitals should formulate contingency plans to deal with the initial surge o f walking wounded 
patients. Less severely injured patients, including the walking wounded and worried well, often self­
transport from the scene to the nearest hospital immediately after the event. These patients may
• not have been triaged by emergency medical services (EMS),
• arrive at the hospital before the more severely injured and may continue to arrive for several 
hours, and
• overwhelm the receiving hospital and delay treatment of more critically injured patients. 
Delays in declaring a mass casualty event
The three common delays in declaring an M CE that may complicate hospital surge capacity are
• Late Incident Recognition: Incident recognition is the point in time at which hospital 
leadership becomes aware that a significant event is evolving. Limited or ineffective situational 
awareness is the main factor preventing adequate response.
• Delayed Notification and Activation: Delays in delivering lifesaving interventions and 
definitive care are caused by taking a reactive approach (partial, gradual, and linear activation 
of emergency systems). A proactive approach, which involves full and simultaneous activation 
of all emergency systems followed by gradual withdrawal based on gathered information, helps 
avoid delay.
• Linear Mobilization of Resources: Linear transition (a form of reactive approach) from 
normal operations to appropriate response level causes delays. The transition should be 
proactive, simultaneous, and nonlinear in scale and scope. Extensive discussion and planning 
support linear activation and should be reserved until after the response.
Time constraints
The response to a TUE-M CE requires rapid intervention and should be based primarily at the 
local level. Local emergency operation plans that are routinely exercised and integrated into regular 
operations will function effectively.
Limited health care workforce
Health care workers may not report during an emergency, either because they cannot reach the 
facility or are concerned for their safety or that o f family members. To minimize staffing shortages, 
planning must include provisions for the security of health care workers and their families. Not 
adequately addressing their concerns may lower the motivation for personnel to report to work.
Poor triage
Commonly, the triage process will not function as expected because of stress that contributes to 
overtriage and failure to alter the balance between quantity of patients and quality of care.
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Management of Patient Surge: Overview
Components of Patient Surge M anagement
•  Planning •  Hospital Incident Command System
• Surge capacity and capability map •  Mass casualty event sites
•  Exercises and drills •  Security
•  Redundant systems • Recovery: Ending the emergency
• Triage and level of care status
Planning
Every hospital should have a collaborated and coordinated crisis plan. Plans, protocols, checklists, 
and signs facilitate hospital management and minimize chaos during emergencies. Managing by 
standardized procedures reduces confusion among individuals under severe stress. In a disaster, people 
have difficulty making good decisions, which is the rationale for implementing and using prepared 
crisis protocols. Too often, leaders are told to think outside the box during a massive crisis. However, 
in an M CE, hospital personnel must first go into the box, be fully aware of the protocols, and 
implement them immediately. Only after working inside the box is there space for going out of the 
box to close gaps, adapt responses, and innovate if and as necessary.
Protocols should be simple, short, realistic, workable, and practical. They should cover interaction 
with other key agencies; be evaluated continuously (threats, lessons learned, experiences); enable 
functioning as an integrated and unified system during emergency; be easily compiled into binders, 
color-coded by type of incident; be located in an easily accessible place; and be revised as soon as new 
information compels a change in the plan and on predetermined revision dates.
Surge capacity and capability map
Hospitals should develop a planning framework (surge capacity and capability map) that presents 
all available and relevant internal and external resources. This framework should be transparent, 
updated, and shared with key disaster response participants, both during preparedness and response. 
The surge CC map should describe potential resources and the appropriate contact information. The 
resource assessment of any health care facility should be part o f the internal disaster plan. Before an 
M CE, the responsiveness and depth of each health care facility in a given region should be established 




































Prior to a TUE-M CE, mandatory regular exercises with executive officers, meta-leaders, community 
representatives, and all relevant agencies should be conducted. These drills should include annual, 
unannounced limited-scale exercises and the use o f smart casualties (people posing as casualties).
Four levels of drills are valuable:
1. focal (vertical) exercise for tasks specific to mass casualty events,
2. table-top (horizontal) exercises for senior personnel,
3. functional exercises for all personnel in charge, and
4. full-scale real-time drills with full participation of hospital staff.
Performance in drills and exercises should be methodically evaluated with input from other hospitals, 
health care systems, and response agencies. Identified concerns should be addressed prior to the 
next exercise.
Redundant systems
Failures of equipment, communication, and infrastructure may occur during an emergency. To 
minimize disruptions in surge management, redundant systems reserved for contingencies should 
be established. Hospitals should have contingency plans for electrical power backup, protection of 
communication and computer infrastructure, and evacuation and shelter procedures. In addition, 
hospital design should minimize potential hazards and improve work flow during an emergency.
Triage and level o f  care
To provide care for the greatest number of patients, physicians may need to alter standards of triage 
and individual-level care to maximize the number o f lives saved and minimize the consequences of 
nonfatal injuries. A simple model of triage for victims classifies patients as either walking or non­
walking. The walking do not typically require emergency medical treatment and include the worried 
well who are noninjured individuals exposed to the event. The non-walking are those patients who 
should receive immediate emergency treatment or are too injured to survive.
A triage officer should be assigned to manage the hospital’s medical response and should ideally be an 
emergency physician or a surgeon experienced in trauma care. The initial triage site should be located 
at or near the ED entrance. A secondary triage site may be necessary if the original triage site becomes 
overwhelmed by an influx o f casualties.
The following principles should be incorporated into protocols:
• Develop flexible triage protocols based on uniform criteria for mass casualty triage18 
(see Figure 1) and strive for systems that are:
• simple, easy to remember, and amenable to quick memory aids;
• applicable to all ages and patient populations; and
• easily modified for changes in resource availability and patient conditions.
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• Develop a color-coded patient (LSI) prioritization protocol: red (immediate), yellow (delayed), 
green (minimal), grey (expectant), and black (deceased).
• Consider lifesaving interventions for each patient when:
• equipment is readily available,
• intervention is within provider’s scope o f practice,
• procedure can be quickly performed, and
• continuing post-procedure care does not require provider’s presence at bedside.
• Reserve the use of imaging and lab testing for clinical conditions based on flexible triage 
protocols.
• Reduce provider documentation and other administrative responsibilities.
Figure 1: Model Uniform Core Criteria




































Hospital Incident Command System
As an incident unfolds and details begin to emerge, the hospital management team should quickly 
transition from reactive to proactive management. To respond to the bombing aftermath, hospital
directors should develop an integrated and 
coordinated Hospital Incident Command System 
(HICS). The HICS should define responsibilities, 
prioritize responses based on a predictable chain 
o f management, and develop clear reporting 
channels and common nomenclature to facilitate
To respond to the bo m b in g  a fte rm ath , 
hospita l d irectors shou ld  develop an 
in teg ra ted  a n d  coo rd in a ted  Hosp ita l 
Inc ident C om m and  System (HICS).
communications.
The HICS requires the following main components:
• Incident Commander: the individual who assumes overall authority and responsibility for the 
hospital preparedness and response to a mass casualty event. This individual is also responsible 
for activating the emergency plan.
• Command Center: the location from which the hospital’s response to the emergency will be 
coordinated. This facility should be equipped with multiple alternative means of internal and 
external communication, stable power source, and security.
• Operations Officer: the individual who gathers and builds an overall picture of the event and 
records any actions taken by the HICS.
• Liason Officer: the individual responsible for communicating with external relevant agencies, 
including EMS, other health facilities, law enforcement, fire, search and rescue, public health, 
local office of emergency preparedness, and military.
• Public Information: the organizational hub for contact with the media and coordinated 
communication between the hospital and the public. Prepared consistent messaging should be 
available through the HICS.
Mass casualty event sites
Primary emergency response areas must be identified to handle the crisis. Specifically, these areas 
include
• hospital command center,





• fatality management site.
Designated areas should also be named for the worried well, media, family, and visitors. A relative 
center can be used as a resource for individuals searching for information about their missing 




Hospitals should maintain control and security within their boundaries as law enforcement resources 
may be severely taxed. Hospitals may be targets for bombing attacks, and security officials should 
maintain increased vigilance. Strategies may include
• increasing uniformed security presence,
• ensuring security for hospital personnel, supplies, and assets,
• enhancing monitoring of sensitive entry points and hospital surroundings,
• addressing crowd control and handling the influx of individuals looking for missing 
relatives, and
• preventing terrorists from targeting hospital facilities.
Recovery: Ending the emergency status
Just as preparing for rapidly transitioning from normal to emergency status is critical, preparing to 
quickly return to routine activities is also important. Debriefing of personnel can reduce event-related 
mental health effects and obtain input on lessons learned for use in future crises.
Management of Patient Surge: Resources
Resource Challenges for Hospitals M anaging a Patient Surge
•  Staff capacity •  Medical supplies •  Blood bank
Staff capacity
The capacity to mobilize adequate numbers of qualified personnel (particularly trauma teams) to care 
for victims is essential. The kinds of expertise required include emergency medicine, trauma surgery, 
intensive care, hospitalists, anesthesiology, otolaryngology, mental health, pharmacy, blood bank, 
radiology, pediatrics, nursing, administration, and support. Consider the following issues:
• Continuing Education and Trauma Training: This education should be a mandatory 
component of disaster management training for all physicians, health care workers, and health 
professions students. Physicians and nurses must have up-to-date knowledge of the potential 
types of injuries encountered and the treatments required after bomb blasts.
• Leadership: Hospital administrators and senior leaders should lead drills and be an integral 
part of the training exercises for response to a bombing event.
• Workforce and Human Resource Needs: These issues should be anticipated, and policies 
should be outlined to
• address personal safety and family concerns,
• compensate for extra hours and injuries,
• use licensed professionals outside their normal scopes of practice or license geography,



































• prepare to manage health professional volunteers and other untrained individuals who 
appear spontaneously,
• change staff scheduling as needed, and
• make mental health professionals available for first responders and staff counseling. 
Medical supplies
To increase access to supplies, pre-arranged contracts with commercial vendors should be activated. 
Pre-equipped mobile carts reserved for disaster contingencies and critical equipment should be 
transported to specific M CE sites.
Blood bank
Hospitals should ensure immediate availability o f blood and blood products. The existing resource 
supply chain o f resources should be able to manufacture, test, store, and distribute these products.
Management of Patient Surge: Mass Casualty Events
Challenges for Hospitals M anaging Mass Casualty Events
•  Receiving casualties • Patient identification
•  Space capacity •  Victim tracking
•  Hospital decompression
Receiving casualties
The process o f receiving casualties involves four stages:
1. Activating the System: At the initial stage, hospital staff are called in and reverse-triage is ensured 
(i.e., ability to care for mass numbers of casualties).
2. Casualties Arriving: The incident is evolving, and the ultimate scope of the incident is still 
unknown. At this stage, trauma care provided to noncritical casualties should be minimal. The 
leader should conserve key trauma-related resources for the yet unknown number of critically 
injured casualties.
3. Casualties No Longer Arriving: The patient load is well defined, and hospital resources are still 
mobilized. This stage continues until definitive care is provided to all casualties.
4. Recovery: The response period ends, and the hospital returns to normal capacities while 
remaining ready for another TUE-M CE.
Space capacity
To care for a patient surge, hospitals must augment care space dramatically. Admission capacity
will be determined by the number of available beds and hospital personnel. Specific considerations
may include
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• Facilitating Inflow: During an emergency event, the hospital experiences a massive inflow of
• Space Availability: Hospital plans should be 
designed specifically to receive a massive inflow 
and distribute patients along predetermined 
routes to specified sites. Plans should consider 
the following areas:
• Diversion: Divert additional patients to less- 
crowded facilities.
• Emergency department: Discharge ED patients 
who can continue their care at home or another 
medical facility (reverse triage).
• Intensive care unit (ICU): Move ICU patients 
who can safely be managed to other care units.
• Hospital beds: Identify and discharge inpatients 
who may continue their care at home or 
another medical facility.
• Operating rooms (ORs): Determine 
availability of ORs, cancel elective surgeries 
and procedures, and prepare multiple ORs for 
emergent procedures.
• Alternative Care Sites: Use pre-designated alternative care sites to increase space capacity, and 
add beds and supplementary equipment.
• Mass Mortuary Site: Establish a space to store bodies of patients who die; this space should 
be in or near the hospital but away from the ED.
Victim tracking
In an M CE, hospitals are overwhelmed with a sudden influx o f casualties and fatalities. Using a 
casualty tracking data system that is coordinated across all medical facilities is essential. The system 
should be capable o f registering, documenting, and tracking victims to help make families’ search for 
missing relatives as efficient as possible.
Hospital decompression
Large numbers o f casualties from a terrorist incident commonly self-refer or self-transport to hospitals 
in the immediate vicinity of the event. Three main approaches enable hospital facilities to prevent 
system collapse through decompression:
1. Outside Diversion: Additional casualties and other patients should be directed to other facilities 
that have sufficient capacity.
2. Secondary Relocation (Inter-Facility Transfer): Each hospital should carefully consider its 
facility limitations and casualty thresholds and be prepared to give advance warning to the medical 
command and control center (MCCC) before reaching capacity. The overloaded hospital may 



































3. Triage Hospital: After capacity is reached, the affected facility should be designated a triage 
hospital, where only lifesaving procedures are performed prior to transfer to other hospitals.
The M C CC  should send transportation, including ground 
The m anagem ent o f  the acute  ambulances and helicopters, for immediate evacuation from
situation sets the tone fo r  the  a triage hospitaL An EMS officer should be deployed to
the triage hospital to determine the types of transportation 
required.
Patient identification
In an M CE, hospitals are overwhelmed with a sudden influx o f patients and fatalities. Data systems, 
coordinated across all medical facilities, can help hospitals register, document, and track victims. 
Through this system, citizens can call any hospital throughout the region to locate family members. 
The system could include the following features:
• digital photographs of each incoming victim with altered mental status upon arrival to 
the hospital;
• input o f digital pictures and any descriptions of victims and their personal belongings 
into a computerized database;
• placement of each patient’s belongings in a prepared sack that accompanies the patient 
at all times, and
• personnel or trained volunteers to staff telephones and assist with victim identification 
and family liaison.
Public Information
• Leaders have much influence over the expectations, understanding, and responses of both 
individuals and communities to an MCE. The management o f the acute situation sets the 
tone for the ways society will respond. Accurately describing ongoing efforts and successfully 
forecasting predictable events will enhance the credibility of authorities and diminish negative 
outcomes. Informing the public in a timely manner can decrease the flow o f worried well 
patients and lessen demands on the health care system. This communications campaign 
should be a joint effort by EMS, hospitals, and other health care facilities.
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Conclusion
The purpose o f this document is to prepare policy planners to respond to terrorist bombings 
and mass casualty events. The majority of the information focuses on first responders, hospital 
administrators, and hospital staff, as they are most likely to be affected.
The document discusses the concept of meta-leadership, which draws on natural leaders who work 
in various settings and use their skills to help direct both their own organizations’ responses and the 
inter-organizational responses that will be critical to a successful response. This document offers these 
leaders interim guidance for developing plans to meet the needs of specific facilities and locations. 
Effective preparation will help maintain critical systems and can improve both the clinical and 
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